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Beyond the 
Washington Consensus: 
an ECLAC perspective 
José Antonio Ocampo 
Executive Secretary, This paper updates and complements the ideas that ECLAC has 
ECLAC 
been putting forward throughout the 1990s, beginning with the 
document Changing production patterns with social equity and 
the contributions of Fernando Fajnzylber. After a short introduc-
tory section (section I), the salient features of the present situ-
ation of the region in the macroeconomic, social and production 
restructuring fields are examined in section II. In the following 
sections, guidelines and policies are proposed in each of these 
areas, with proposals that emphasize the common need to make 
progress with a second wave of reforms which are not merely 
limited to greater liberalization of markets, but seek a pragmatic 
inter-relationship between the State and the market. Section III 
examines the macroeconomic challenges involved, especially 
ways of handling external vulnerability and the investment, sav-
ing and financing process. Key areas at the mesoeconomic level 
are then analysed, especially technological development, the stra-
tegic complementarities between investment decisions, and the 
regulation of infrastructure services (section IV). Finally, section 
V deals with the issues of equity and social policy, especially the 
factors determining equity, the spaces for social policy, and the 
second generation reforms in this field. 
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I 
Introduction* 
In the course of the 1990s, the international and re-
gional economic debate has gradually been changing 
in terms of its content. The initial emphasis on the 
principles of the Washington Consensus on macroe-
conomic adjustment and market liberalization has 
been giving way to a more balanced view in which, 
as the chief economist of the World Bank recently 
noted, more instruments and broader objectives are 
proposed for the development process (Stiglitz, 
1998). While not denying the importance of macroe-
conomic stability and the advantages of more open 
markets, improved functioning of such markets and 
of the public structures is increasingly seen as an im-
portant complementary means of pursuing objectives 
which go beyond economic growth to include equity 
and social cohesion, environmental sustainability and 
democratic development. 
In line with this approach, it is argued here that 
after the advances made through the structural re-
forms in the areas of macroeconomic stability, exter-
nal openness and rationalization of the State, a 
second wave of reforms is now called for. These re-
forms cannot be limited merely to greater liberaliza-
tion of the markets, however, but must pragmatically 
seek a mutual relationship between the State and the 
II 
The most noteworthy economic event in the 1990s in 
Latin America and the Caribbean is undoubtedly the 
renewal of growth. This has been much more evident 
in Latin America, where the average growth rate of 
* This is a revised version of the document prepared for the 
seminar "Development models and policies: a tribute to Aníbal 
Pinto" organized by the Inter-American Development Bank and 
the Brazilian National Economic Development Bank (Rio de 
Janeiro, 22-23 June 1998). The author wishes to thank Oscar 
Altimir, Osvaldo Rosales and Osvaldo Sunkel for their comments 
on a previous version of this paper and also wishes to express his 
gratitude for the collaboration received from various ECLAC 
staff members, including in particular Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, 
market which will make it possible to develop such a 
broad agenda. In some cases, it may also be neces-
sary to reform the reforms themselves, in order to 
correct gaps in the first wave of reforms which have 
become evident in recent years (Ffrench-Davis, forth-
coming). The present article updates and comple-
ments the ideas put forward by ECLAC in the course 
of the 1990s, beginning with the document Changing 
production patterns with social equity (ECLAC, 1990) 
and the seminal contributions of Fernando Fajnzylber 
on which it was based (see in particular Fajnzylber, 
1990). 
The article first makes a brief review of the fea-
tures of the present situation in the region and then 
deals successively with the main issues of : macro-
economic management, mesoeconomic management, 
and the distribution of the fruits of development. Un-
fortunately, shortage of space prevents similar con-
sideration of other equally important aspects such as 
environmental sustainability, democratic develop-
ment and government structures, The brevity of the 
article means that it is not possible to do full justice to 
each of the issues dealt with, but it does serve to outline 
the basic elements of the strategy which ECLAC has 
been proposing to the countries of the region. 
GDP between 1990 and 1998 was markedly greater 
than in the previous decade (3.2% as against 1.2% in 
the 1980s) and speeded up in all countries except 
Paraguay. In the Caribbean, however, the average 
Gunther Held and Stephany Griffith-J ones, who took part in the 
preparation of previous documents, some of whose conclusions 
are incorporated in part II of this article. Conversations with 
Oscar Altimir and Samuel Morley were extremely useful in 
clarifying some of the ideas in section V, which to a large 
extent incorporates the findings of a previous document by the 
present author (Ocampo, 1998a). Finally, the author also wishes 
to thank Camilo Tovar for preparing the tables and figures of 
this article. 
An overview of the region 
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growth rate continues to be lower (1.5%), and there 
are signs of slackening in a number of countries. 
The average growth of the region not only contin-
ues to be slower than the level which ECLAC considers 
desirable for closing the gaps separating the region from 
the most highly developed countries (6 %-7 % per year) 
but is aso lower than the average rate (5.5% per year) 
registered by the region between the 1950s and the 1970s 
(figure 1). It also reflects the difficulty of recovering 
the levels of investment registered in the phase of fastest 
economic growth. Figure 2 clearly illustrates this phe-
nomenon: the rate of investment has recovered from 
20% of GDP at the beginning of the decade to an 
average of 23% or 24% in recent years, but it is still 
well below the levels registered before the debt crisis. 
A feature which also gives grounds for concern is 
that national saving has remained at a low level, so 
that the financing of investment now depends to a 
greater extent on external saving (figure 3). 
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This faster growth has been accompanied by 
greater macroeconomic stability. The stability 
achieved -unprecedented in several decades- and the 
promptness with which the authorities take decisive 
action to deal with any financial imbalances which 
arise are clear signs of strength which have endowed 
the region with some strengths in the face of the up-
sets generated by the Asian crisis (ECLAC, 1998c). 
The clearest sign of macroeconomic stability is the 
reduction in inflation. Even after all the hyperinfla-
tionary processes had been brought under control, re-
ducing the rate of price increases from averages of 
three digits at the beginning of the decade to 25.9% 
in 1995, the rate was further reduced to only 10.5% 
in 1997 and 10.2% in .1998. Furthermore, although 
problems still persist in some countries and there are 
clear cases of fragility, the reduction of fiscal deficits 
to average levels of between 1 % and 2% of GDP is 
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FIGURE 5 
Latin America and the Caribbean: 















another sign of the progress made in terms of stabil-
ity, as noted in the recent ECLAC report entitled The 
fiscal covenant (ECLAC, 1998b). 
There are, however, some elements of concern in 
this field. The first is the great sensitivity of eco-
nomic growth to capital inflows (figure 4), one of 
whose most disturbing elements is the tendency to 
replace domestic saving with external saving (see 
section III of this paper). The second is the great 
sensitivity of the trade deficit to growth (figure 5), 
which in turn reflects the high income-elasticity of 
demand for imports currently displayed by the Latin 
American economies. In this context, the bias dis-
played by the recent packages of stabilization meas-
ures -emphasis on fiscal and monetary measures, yet 
great reluctance to use relative prices (the exchange 
rate) as an adjustment mechanism- seems paradoxi-
cal in view of the widespread process of real revalu-
ation undergone by the region in the 1990s. This can 
bring lower rates of inflation (which is why this pol-
icy mix is more justified in countries with an impor-
tant inflationary tradition), but it can lead to greater 
contraction than is necessary in the downward phase 
of the business cycle and, in general, can cause more 
unstable behaviour of economic activity. 
On the export side, the greater dynamism induced 
by the reform processes is beyond question. The vol-
ume of exports has been rising by an average of more 
than 10% per year since 1993, which is much faster 
than the average 5% growth rates of the 1980s and 
early 1990s. Intra-regional trade has been particularly 
buoyant. Mutual trade within MERCOSUR and the An-
dean Community grew at the rate of 20% a year in 
the last five years, which puts it among the most 
FIGURE 6 
Latin America: Export diversification 
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dynamic trade flows in the world. This process has 
coincided with a major diversification of exports: the 
share of primary commodities has gone down, as the 
relative importance of exports of manufactures has 
increased. This process has been particularly marked 
in the case of Mexico, but it is also true for the region as 
a whole even when that country is excluded (figure 6). 
Intra-regional trade has played a decisive role in this 
diversification. The trade boom has been based on a 
policy of open regionalism which has broken both with 
regional practices of the past (including the tendency to 
restrict integration agreements to non-competitive trade) 
and with the more orthodox views on economic inte-
gration (ECLAC, 1994). 
Finally, the trade boom has coincided with an 
unprecedented increase in foreign direct investment: 
from a little over US$ 10 billion at the beginning of 
the decade to US$ 55 billion in 1997 (ECLAC, 1998e). 
This growth has been based fundamentally on three 
processes: the privatization of State assets in the serv-
ices and natural resources sectors (telecommunica-
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tions, financial services, energy and gas, etc.); the 
establishment or improvement of suitable conditions 
for the participation of private capital in the infra-
structure and mining sectors, and the reorganization 
of transnational manufacturing firms in order to im-
prove their international competitiveness under regional 
agreements (including the North American Free Trade 
Agreement and the Caribbean Basin Initiative) or to 
defend their shares in national or subregional markets. 
Last but not least, there has been an unprecedented in-
crease in intra-regional investments. The increase in di-
rect investment has markedly improved the structure of 
the capital flows received by the region, undoubtedly 
helping to explain in part the strengths of the region in 
the face of recent upsets. 
Although a full assessment has not yet been made 
of the processes of restructuring of production at the 
sectoral and microeconomic levels, some studies under 
way allow some generalizations. Although there are big 
differences between countries and sectors, companies 
have shown a surprising capacity to adapt both to the 
upsets of the 1980s and to the radical changes in the 
macroeconomic and mesoeconomic environment in the 
1990s (see, for example, Peres (éd.), 1997). Various 
strategies, both defensive and offensive, have been 
adopted for this purpose (ECLAC, 1996; Benavente, 
Crespi, Katz and Stumpo, 1997; Katz, 1998). The 
defensive strategies have been centered on: i) organ-
izational restructuring (reduction of the number of 
hierarchical levels, concentration of activities in busi-
ness units or centres, enhancement of the professional 
quality of management); ii) restructuring of produc-
tion with minimal investment (reduction of production 
lines, greater specialization and de-verticalization, both 
by importing specialized inputs and by outsourcing pro-
duction activities); and üi) new marketing strategies 
(imports of goods and their marketing in order to 
complete a wide range of products and improvements 
in client-supplier relations). The offensive strategies 
included the foregoing but also added substantial in-
creases in new equipment and technology, acquisition 
of international licenes and strategic alliances with 
national, regional and transnational partners. The re-
sponse capacity displayed shows that there has been 
some solid learning in previous stages of develop-
ment. Trade integration has played a very important 
role in this process of adaptation, especially in the 
branches of manufacturing with the highest techno-
logical content, which makes it possible to take ad-
vantage of economies of specialization and enter into 
strategic intra-regional alliances to serve markets 
TABLE i 
Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countries): 
Relative productivity gap compared with 















































Source: Katz (1998). 
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which to other partners in the alliance know better. 
The adaptation of the larger enterprises has generally 
been less traumatic than that of the small and me-
dium-sized firms, but even the former have lost 
ground to transnationals. 
Generally speaking, however, there continues to 
be a substantial technological gap between manufac-
turing in the region and the best international prac-
tices (table 1). Some countries (especially Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia and Mexico) are narrowing this gap: a 
process which began in almost all these cases in the 
1980s and which, in two countries (Colombia and 
Mexico), was interrupted in the present decade. A 
very large number of enterprises have applied defen-
sive strategies of administrative reorganization and 
rationalization of their production processes, but the 
number which have moved on to offensive strategies, 
making heavy investments in equipment and technol-
ogy and thus coming closer to the international tech-
nological frontier, is much smaller. In the cases where 
companies have expanded, there has been a tendency to 
increase employment, although with a much higher 
capital-labour ratio than in the past and with tech-
nologies making heavy use of computerization. In the 
case of the firms which have applied exclusively de-
fensive strategies, the increase in productivity has 
been accompanied by a contraction in levels of em-
ployment, so that industrial employment has gone 
down markedly in almost all the countries of the re-
gion. The decline in the cost of capital goods which 
accompanied the recovery of the 1990s referred to 
earlier has also furthered this process. 
Although in one group of countries the agricul-
tural sector has recovered growth rates similar to or 
higher than those of the 1970s, this has not occurred 
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in the region as a whole. Furthermore, in many coun-
tries there is a disturbing weakening of the institu-
tions for the development and transfer of agricultural 
technology, and the smaller producers have been af-
fected by the disappearance or serious problems of 
the bodies which previously gave them support, with-
out these bodies having been replaced by others of 
equal or greater effectiveness (Ocampo, 1998b). 
The existing studies indicate that the population 
under the poverty line increased markedly in the 1980s. 
In the 1990s the situation has improved in most coun-
tries of the region, but even so, with few exceptions, 
the percentage of poor households is higher than be-
fore the debt crisis. In 1980, 35% of all Latin Ameri-
can households were in a state of poverty, and by 
1990 that proportion had risen to 41%, but the level 
still stood at 39% in 1994 (unfortunately, there are no 
similar estimates for the Caribbean or more recent 
global calculations for Latin America as a whole).1 
The 1980s was also a period of deterioration in terms 
of income distribution. Expectations that the renewal 
of economic growth would reverse that trend have 
not materialized, and indeed there has been a further 
deterioration in some countries, so that the levels of 
inequality are now greater than the already high lev-
els which existed before the debt crisis (ECLAC, 1997; 
IDB, 1997; Morley, 1995). 
In the 1990s, there are two particularly disturb-
ing tendencies in the labour market which are gener-
ating additional pressures in the direction of greater 
inequality. The first of them is the growing disparity 
between the wages of the highly skilled workers and 
those who have lower levels of skills (ECLAC, 1997). 
This gap has increased in almost all the countries of Latin 
America during the first half of the 1990s (figure 7). The 
second tendency is the low level of generation of formal 
employment and the consequent deterioration in the qual-
ity of jobs. According to estimates by the ILO (1997), a 
little over 8 out of every 10 jobs created in the 1990s 
correspond to low-quality jobs in the informal sector. Al-
though the informal sector continues to be the main 
!
 Because of the reduction in poverty in Brazil as a result of the 
successful application of the Piano Real and the subsequent re-
adjustment in minimum wages, the global poverty indicator has 
almost certainly continued to go down in recent years. The reduc-
tion in poverty in a broad group of countries of the region in the 
1990s is also noted by Morley (1997), on the basis of the results of 
a comparative study organized by UNDP, IDB and ECLAC. 
FIGURE 7 
Latin America: Wage gap 
A. Between professionals and formal-sector workers 
Bolivia pSÊÊÊÊ^ÊÊÊKÊÊÊÊKÊÊ^ 
Chile M M M W W W ^ 
Colombia WBiljiBWÉWIIIMWi^TOqi 






0 50 100 ¡50 200 250 300 350 400 450 













0 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 
I El 1994 • 1990 
means by which the Latin American economies 
tackle the problem of the low rate of creation of jobs, 
the rate of open unemployment also increased in 
most of the countries of the region in the three-year 
period 1995-1997 (ECLAC, 1998d). 
Furthermore, in the 1980s the crisis was reflected 
in a marked reduction in public social expenditure, 
both on a per capita basis and as a proportion of GDP. 
In the 1990s, such expenditure has recovered the lev-
els registered before the debt crisis in Latin America, 
but not in the Caribbean. This recovery has been un-
even in the different countries, however, and has 
been concentrated in types of expenditure which, ac-
cording to the existing studies, have the least favour-
able impact on distribution (e.g., expenditure on 
social security). Per capita expenditure on education, 
however, only recovered its pre-crisis level in the 
mid-1990s (ECLAC, 1998b, chapter VI). 
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III 
The macroeconomic challenges 
The recovery of high levels of macroeconomic stabil-
ity, the positive view taken of the opportunities offered 
by open regionalism in the present context of globaliza-
tion, and the search for more effective and efficient 
State structures are achievements of the economic re-
structuring process which has taken place in Latin 
America and the Caribbean in recent decades. As we 
have seen, however, there are still two disturbing ele-
ments in the macroeconomic area: the high sensitivity 
of growth to external capital flows and the insuffi-
cient recovery of investment levels. 
1. Dealing with external vulnerability 
In the 1990s, the Asian crisis came on top of the 
1994-1995 "tequila effect" and the crisis in the Euro-
pean monetary system in 1992-1993, as well, of 
course, as the Latin American debt crisis in the pre-
vious decade. The instability characteristic of interna-
tional capital flows, which has shown itself in this 
way in recent decades, is inherent in the functioning 
of such flows, as shown by economic history2 and the 
extensive literature on market flaws associated with 
information problems. As a result, the market has gone 
through a succession of waves of excessive expan-
sion and financial panic, indicating that it tends first 
all to grow and then to contract more than is called 
for by fundamental economic factors. During the 
recent crises, other phenomena have become increas-
ingly evident: the shortcomings in macroeconomic 
coordination among the nations which are most influen-
tial in the markets and the absence of suitable interna-
tional institutions to manage a sophisticated but 
unstable financial market. 
Thus, there is no international institution which 
helps to prevent the development of unsustainable fi-
nancial booms, and the International Monetary Fund 
has only a limited capacity to handle the subsequent 
crises. The Bank for International Settlements has 
made some progress in the formulation of rules on 
bank prudential regulation and supervision, but they 
2
 For a Latin American view, see the classic study by Bacha and 
Diaz-Alejandro (1982). 
have only been implemented to a limited extent so 
far. The risk grading agencies, for their part, which 
should be playing a role in this area, tend to accentu-
ate rather than smooth financial cycles, as a recent 
study by the OECD Development Centre shows 
(Larrain, Reisen and von Maltzan, 1997). 
This indicates that the present time would be a 
good opportunity for rethinking the international fi-
nancial order but not a good time for considering 
further liberalization of that market: an issue which is 
currently under discussion in connection with the 
idea of the changing the statutes of the IMF to give it 
mandates with regard to the convertibility of the capi-
tal account. In this field, recent experience indicates 
two things. First, our attention should be centered on 
managing booms, not crises, since the latter are in 
many respects the result of booms which have not 
been properly managed. This is an essential point, 
since to some extent the existing institutions, espe-
cially the IMF, have been designed solely to handle 
crises, whereas we lack suitable instruments to warn 
us about the generation of unsustainable booms or, 
even better, prevent them. Secondly, the absence of a 
suitable regulatory framework at the international level 
justifies the adoption of national measures aimed pre-
cisely at controlling booms which the authorities con-
sider to be unsustainable, especially the systems of 
compulsory reserve requirements on external liabilities 
which Colombia and Chile have been using success-
fully. The design of suitable domestic mechanisms 
for handling the volatility of external financial flows 
has in fact been one of the central issues studied by 
ECLAC in recent years (see, for example, ECLAC, 
1998a, part 3 and Ffrench-Davis and Reisen (eds.), 
1998). 
The design of these measures should be based on 
the development of suitable policy instruments and 
institutions for handling booms or -which amounts to 
the same thing- for forestalling crises. In reality, the 
excessive attention given to crisis management over-
looks a fact which ought to be self-evident; the lee-
way for action open to the authorities is greater in 
booms than in crises. Once a crisis breaks out, the 
authorities have no option but to take the necessary 
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measures to restore confidence, which means in prac-
tice the adoption of procyclical measures. A boom 
marked by excessive expansion of public and private 
expenditure inevitably gives way to an adjustment 
whose severity depends on the excessiveness of the pre-
vious expenditure. Thus, an unsustainable increase in 
public expenditure based on windfall tax revenue and 
transitory access to external credit gives rise to a severe 
subsequent adjustment Excessive private sector indebt-
edness, based on underestimation of the risks of such 
indebtedness, gives rise to a subsequent severe contrac-
tion in credit which, in the context of lower growth rates 
and higher real interest rates typical of adjustment 
phases, can lead to portfolio losses equivalent to high 
proportions of GDP, as is shown by a wide range of 
bank crises inside and outside the region. Overvaluation 
of the currency based on windfall capital inflows or 
transitory high prices of export products gives rise to 
heavy pressure on the exchange rate or interest rates 
once those transitory phenomena disappear. 
Thus, the basic challenge for handling the exter-
nal vulnerability of the economies of the region is to 
design suitable instruments for managing boom peri-
ods, that is to say, for forestalling crises. Some such 
instruments have been extensively highlighted, espe-
cially those connected with the establishment of 
strong prudential regulation of the domestic financial 
systems, including both suitable capital requirements 
for the financial intermediaries and systems of pru-
dential regulation and supervision designed to pre-
vent them from assuming unmanageable risks in 
boom periods. One of the corollaries of the foregoing 
analysis is that, when the vulnerability is greater than 
that which is characteristic of the more industrialized 
nations, the capital requirements of financial interme-
diaries should be stricter than those proposed by the 
Basle Committee of the Bank for International Settle-
ments. There should also be strict prudential supervi-
sion of short-term external credits, particularly those 
intermediated by the domestic financial system. Spe-
cial caution should also be adopted with respect to 
the use of assets whose prices are of an excessively 
cyclical nature as collateral for debts. For this reason, 
in periods of inflated asset prices, it is appropriate to 
make the requirements with respect to the use of such 
collateral more severe. Naturally, as the recent con-
troversies on the Asian crisis also show, the authori-
ties must give clear signals that they will in no 
circumstances take any action to save the assets of 
the owners of financial institutions (and act appropri-
ately if a crisis does break out), thus avoiding "moral 
hazard" problems and demanding transparency in 
corporate finances in order to prevent additional fi-
nancial risks. 
In the foreign exchange area, the market has re-
peatedly rewarded a good external debt structure; 
hence, efforts to improve the maturity profile of pub-
lic and private external liabilities play an essential 
role. In the case of public sector indebtedness, direct 
control should be exerted over the liabilities of all 
public entities, even those which are autonomous or 
quasi-autonomous. In the case of private indebted-
ness, as already noted, a system of compulsory re-
serve requirements (or taxes) on foreign currency 
liabilities is desirable. Such a system helps to im-
prove the debt profile and, at least according to some 
studies, also tends to reduce (at least temporarily) the 
magnitude of flows during boom periods, thus play-
ing the additional role of moderating the exchange 
rate and monetary pressures generated during such 
periods. The system designed by Argentina -estab-
lishing high liquidity requirements for financial insti-
tutions as a function of their short-term liabilities-
can play a similar role. Within certain limits, the 
sterilization of the monetary effects of the increases 
in international reserves generated by capital inflows 
has also proved to be useful for preventing such in-
flows from giving rise to an excessive increase in 
domestic credit. Finally, managed exchange rate 
flexibility can also be useful. For this purpose, how-
ever, it is necessary to allow such flexibility to oper-
ate in both directions, avoiding the bias toward 
revaluation observed in many countries of the region 
throughout the 1990s. 
Handling external vulnerability also requires the 
design of suitable fiscal instruments. These should 
include, primarily, institutional mechanisms to steril-
ize transitory fiscal revenues. The partial experience 
built up in the operation of fiscal stabilization funds 
associated with basic commodity exports should be 
extended to the management of transitory tax reve-
nues. This means that fiscal targets should not be 
established as a function of the current budget deficit, 
but of some measure of the structural deficit, as is 
done in the member countries of the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
Indeed, many countries could opt to fully or partly 
offset short-term private expenditure cycles through 
movements in the opposite direction by public expen-
diture or income, thus allowing public indebtedness 
to compensate for trends in private indebtedness. A 
sound fiscal situation, both in terms of flows (surplus 
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or deficit) and stocks (indebtedness) is essential, to-
gether with the maintenance of sound domestic finan-
cial systems, to obtain the degree of freedom needed 
to handle unfavourable external disturbances. 
2. Investment, saving and finance 
The causal relations between saving, investment and 
growth3 operate in many different directions, giving 
rise to virtuous (or vicious) circles: a high level of 
investment generates more growth, which, in turn, 
increases saving and facilitates the financing of 
higher levels of investment. The empirical evidence 
tends to back up the Keynesian lines of causality, 
however, establishing that higher levels of saving are 
an effect rather than a cause of faster economic 
growth, and that it is the latter, through the accelera-
tor, which induces higher levels of investment. This 
indicates that "autonomous" improvements (or dete-
rioration) in the growth rate tend to reproduce them-
selves, through their positive effects on saving and 
investment. 
On the other hand, high rates of investment are 
invariably associated with high rates of domestic sav-
ing. This association is due fundamentally to the lim-
its which exist on the sustainability of high current 
account deficits (external saving). There is also am-
ple evidence of substitution of domestic saving by 
external saving (figure 8), which strengthens the 
aforementioned linkage and indicates that a substan-
tial part of the variations in the latter are reflected in 
higher or lower levels of public or private consump-
tion.4 Furthermore, greater domestic saving is essen-
tial to cope with episodes of high inflows of capital, 
by accumulating international reserves in order to 
sterilize the expansionary effect of such capital and 
maintain a stable macroeconomic environment. 
High levels of domestic saving are related, in 
turn, with high rates of public and entrepreneurial 
saving. The importance of the latter, in the form of 
undistributed profits and reserves for depreciation, 
was a striking feature of the Asian countries during 
their phase of rapid growth, and it has also been a 
feature of the recent experience of Chile. This indi-
3
 Among many recent contributions to the debate on the mutual 
relations between these variables, see Held and Uthoff (1995), 
ECLAC (1996), Schmidt-Hebeel, Serven and Solimano{1996), Uthoff 
and Titelman (1998) and Gavin, Hausmann and Talvi (1997). 
4
 Half, according to estimates by ECLAC (1996) and Uthoff and 
Titelman (1997). 
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cates that the key to rapid growth is a strong link 
between the investment and profits of enterprises, as 
noted in some recent studies (for example, Akyiiz and 
Gore, 1994). The incentives to retain profits implicit 
in the tax system seem to have been one of the most 
important elements in the recent high business saving 
rate in Chile.5 On the other hand, there is no solid 
evidence in Latin America (or even in general) which 
confirms the positive effects of high interest rates on 
saving. This indicates essentially that the substitution 
effects on which the positive relation between these 
two variables depends are offset by the income effects 
of the higher interest rates, which tend to increase con-
sumption. At all events, interest rates play an important 
role in financial intermediation, in the allocation of re-
sources generated through it, and in the regulation of 
capital flows. Household saving is much more sensitive 
to forced saving mechanisms, especially those associated 
with the social security system, but with other types too 
(for example, prior saving requirements for obtaining 
housing loans, the requirement that part of a worker's 
wages must be saved in severance payment funds, 
etc.). It is worth noting that the importance of public 
saving referred to at the beginning of this paragraph 
also establishes an important connection between 
saving and taxation. Although a reduction in taxation 
can induce higher private saving (and there is thus 
5
 High incentives of this type also give rise to unfavourable effects, 
however, which have not been absent in Chile. In particular, 
they facilitate the concentration of property. They also generate 
incentives for the tax evasion practices which are a natural fea-
ture of any system of taxes on capital income, such as presenting 
private consumption expenditure of the owners of enterprises as 
intermediate expenditures of the latter. 
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some substitution of public saving by private saving), 
it will generally tend to be reflected, through its ef-
fects on the public accounts, in lower overall levels 
of national saving. In other words, taxation operates 
as a forced saving mechanism.6 
In this context, the great expectations aroused by 
the transformation of social security systems from 
unfunded systems into systems based on individual 
capitalization are only partially valid. The most im-
portant effect of these reforms is that on the budget 
deficit, as they make it possible to reduce or elimi-
nate the dissavings which have tended to accumulate 
with the unfunded systems. The new systems can also 
make an important contribution to the supply of long-
term financial resources, although the actual channel-
ing of these into productive activities depends on the 
development of suitable institutional mechanisms. 
The gross contribution to saving made by these sys-
tems tends to be only small, however (a little over 3% 
of GDP during the 1990s in the Chilean case) and 
their net effects depend on whether or not the forced 
savings generated by the social security system are 
offset by smaller voluntary saving. In the case of Chile, 
this latter requirement has not been fulfilled, since the 
greater social security saving seems to have been sub-
stituted by voluntary personal dissaving, facilitated by 
the ample availability of consumer goods and credit 
resulting from the trade and financial liberalization. 
Furthermore, the fiscal cost of these reform processes 
is high and must be taken duly into account before 
embarking on them (ECLAC, 1998b, chapter VII). 
The irreversible nature of investment decisions, 
for its part, means that this variable is sensitive to the 
existence of stable rules and macroeconomic environ-
ments. Measures designed to reduce macroeconomic 
volatility thus have positive effects on it, as also do 
complementary public investments, especially in in-
frastructure, and the availability of long-term external 
or domestic credit. Other important determinants are 
the relative prices of capital goods (which in many 
countries are closely associated with the real ex-
change rate) and, in countries with more highly de-
veloped stock markets, stock prices. Specific fiscal 
incentives, such as those which seek to promote in-
vestment in activities of high technological content, 
can also have favourable effects, but incentives which 
encourage investment in more general terms can 
prove costly in relation to their possible benefits. 
6
 Assuming, of course, Ihat the higher taxation is not reflected in 
excessive public consumption expenditure. 
The efficiency with which the financial market 
channels savings into investment is also an essential 
factor in the development process. Important require-
ments for this are the creation of suitable institutions 
and instruments, with different profit, risk and liquid-
ity profiles, the provision of services with low inter-
mediation costs, and prudential regulation and 
supervision. The public sector has a fundamental role 
to play in ensuring that all these conditions are ful-
filled. We have already referred to the question of 
prudential regulation, in which respect substantial 
progress has been made in many Latin American 
countries. The high cost of financial services almost 
everywhere in the region indicates that there is ample 
room for the promotion of more competitive prac-
tices and for reducing certain macroeconomic uncer-
tainties which are reflected in high intermediation 
spreads. 
We will concentrate our attention, however, on 
the first of these instruments. The two fundamental 
tasks that the public authorities must face in this area 
are to ensure that small enterprises and poor families 
have access to credit, and to promote the availability 
of long-term funds to finance investment. Lines of 
credit through "second-tier" banks, subsidies for de-
mand and/or transaction costs, and the design of 
guarantee funds or insurance mechanisms are the ba-
sic means of ensuring adequate coverage of financial 
services for small enterprises and poor urban and ru-
ral households. In spite of the progress made in some 
countries, this coverage is still very precarious. 
The tendency of savers and creditors to reduce 
their risks by concentrating their operations on short-
term and fixed-income transactions also calls for an 
active role by the public sector in this field. The most 
important mechanisms for this purpose are the crea-
tion of new institutions or instruments (pension 
funds; other institutional investors, including over-
seas funds; new instruments to facilitate the financing 
of housing and private infrastructure; guarantee funds 
or credit insurance, etc.); the design of suitable regu-
latory frameworks and systems of incentives, and the 
supply of financial services by public or mixed devel-
opment banks or venture capital funds.7 In this case, 
7
 The channaling of all or part of the stock of privatized enter-
prises through the stock exchanges and leadership by the govern-
ment in the issue of longer-term bonds are also important 
elements, as is shown by the experience of various countries of 
the region. It is also important to facilitate the issue of bonds or 
shares abroad, even though in this case there is no direct action 
to promote domestic financial intermediation. 
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as in the provision of services for small economic 
agents, almost all the countries have largely main-
tained some public public sector institutions. Indeed, 
this may be the best solution, provided that rules are 
established which ensure the professionalism of their 
activities and efforts are made to avoid political inter-
ference and, above all, the temptation to turn such 
institutions into mechanisms for channeling subsi-
dies, which led to their downfall in the past. How-
ever, progress in this direction, especially in the case 
of the capital market, is limited by a structural fea-
ture: the predominance of primarily family firms, 
which is of course greater in the smaller economies. 
This is a central factor in the design of regulatory and 
market promotion measures (for example, those af-
fecting the use of resources from pension funds). In 
the absence of a broad supply of stocks, development 
banks can do much to help channel those resources 
into investments. Finally, although Latin American 
firms are making increasing use of the international 
market (stock issues on the New York Stock Ex-
change, in particular), there do not seem to be any 
signs of the development of regional stock markets. 
This could be one of the priority areas for public 
action in the future. 
IV 
The functioning of markets, their relation with the 
development of institutions, and the way both of these 
factors affect microeconomic behaviour have been 
among the central issues in ECLAC's proposals in recent 
years. Just as a good macroeconomy is needed to reduce 
or eliminate basic uncertainties affecting the functioning 
of markets, the way markets operate affects, in its turn, 
macroeconomic behaviour. In the ECLAC proposals, a 
good macroeconomy depends on a good mesoeconomy. 
The importance we have assigned to the functioning 
and regulation of the financial and foreign exchange 
markets in the preceding section bears witness to this 
assertion. The fundamental role played by the factors 
referred to at the end of the preceding section on 
economic growth is another important point. 
The key issues at the mesoeconomic level are 
non-existent or incomplete markets and imperfec-
tions in established markets, as well as the close rela-
These considerations suggest the need for both a 
wide range of measures to improve saving and invest-
ment levels and the channels which link those two vari-
ables, and also some recommendations for caution in 
various areas (the foreseeable effects of the social secu-
rity reforms, the impact of reductions in tax rates, or 
increases in interest rates on savings). One of the most 
interesting conclusions is that "autonomous" shifts in 
economic growth -that is to say, movements which are 
independent of the factors determining the saving and 
investment process- can give rise to virtuous (or vi-
cious) circles which are reproduced through their effects 
on saving and investment. The various schools of 
thought on the determinants of economic growth iden-
tify three main channels for this.8 The first is to increase 
human capital: its effects are slow in coming, but its 
great virtue is the complementation which it establishes 
between growth and equity. The second is to speed up 
technological change. The third is to take advantage of 
the strategic complementarities of investment decisions. 
The last two can also have a positive influence on 
growth and equity. Human capital is dealt with in 
section V of this paper, while the other two types of 
channels belong to the mesoeconomic area and will 
be dealt with in the following section. 
tion between the functioning of markets and the for-
mal and informal institutions within which they oper-
ate (the formal institutions being understood as the 
formal public regulation organs and the informal in-
stitutions as the customs, standards and patterns of 
behaviour of agents). The key issues are invariably con-
nected with market failures, both those described in the 
traditional literature on imperfect competition -econo-
mies of scale, externalities and public goods- and the 
problems of information which have been empha-
sized in the economic literature in recent decades. 
Obviously, the possibility of correcting such flaws 
through public action also depends on the correction 
B
 There are, of course, others connected with the legal and socio-
political context. See, for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1995) and Barro (1997). 
Key mesoeconomic areas 
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of the no less important government failures, which 
include the application of rationales which are neither 
economic nor social (bureaucratic or clientele-based) 
to the functioning of institutions, problems of repre-
sentation (principal-agent), the reflection of the domi-
nant economic interests in the actions of institutions 
(i.e., political economy issues), the opportunities for 
rent-seeking opened up by State intervention, and the 
problems of information which also affect govern-
ment actions. 
The pursuit of a suitable balance between the 
market and the State is therefore an inherent feature 
of a good mesoeconomy. Obviously, such a balance 
will necessarily be modified by the fundamental po-
litical decisions of each society. In the present stage 
of development of the countries of the region, this 
means that special efforts should be made to create 
and re-invent institutions, since many of the existing 
institutions are profoundly affected by patterns of be-
haviour inherited from the past or are suffering from 
the deterioration undergone in the course of a long 
period of economic adjustment. This is true not only 
of public institutions affected by bureaucratic proc-
esses or corporative and clientele-based rationales but 
also of private institutions, such as producers' asso-
ciations and trade unions which have not managed to 
adapt completely to the changes in their environment. 
The problem is not solved by the mere elimination of 
institutions that no longer work, as is implicit in 
many policy proposals. In reality, experience has 
shown that the worst of all "institutions" is the lack 
of suitable institutions for dealing with the problems 
which we will analyse in this section. For example, 
one of the lessons painfully learned in many coun-
tries of the region (and, even more so, in transition 
economies) is that the absence of suitable State regu-
lations can turn privatization processes into massive 
transfers of wealth and income, without achieving ef-
ficiency objectives. 
Although the spheres of action at the mesoe-
conomic level are very wide, we will concentrate our 
attention on three of them: technological develop-
ment, strategic complementation between investment 
decisions, and the regulation of infrastructure serv-
ices. These issues, together with the functioning of 
financial markets, to which we already referred in 
section III, and those relating to environmental regu-
lations (which will not be dealt with in this paper), 
are the key mesoeconomic areas. 
1. Technological development 
The problems raised by technological development 
are intimately related with the "tacit" nature of tech-
nical knowledge, i.e., the fact that it cannot be com-
pletely formalized (Katz, 1984; Katz and Kosacoff, 
1998). This means that there is no perfectly codified 
manual ("blueprint") which can be bought in the mar-
ketplace, and that the acquisition of such knowledge 
is therefore necessarily associated with a learning 
process. This learning is also closely linked with 
practical experience in production activities, that is to 
say, it necessarily involves learning by doing. The 
mastery of a particular type of technology depends on 
gaining experience in its use, but in addition experi-
ence makes it possible to create new technologies and 
to make innovations on existing ones. Indeed, tech-
nologies generally need to be adapted in order to apply 
them in new production contexts. This is particularly 
true in the case of disembodied technologies (including 
management and marketing techniques), but it is also 
true of the technologies incorporated in equipment or in 
special inputs (a new plant variety, for example). 
Consequently, technical know-how is both a pre-
condition and a result of the production process. At 
the individual and organizational level, it gives rise to 
a process of maturing as experience is accumulated, 
existing activities are expanded, and new ones are 
undertaken. This process of maturing thus generates 
individual and organizational forms of human capital. 
In both cases, learning is linked to the education of 
the persons involved, giving rise to complementation 
between technological and educational human capi-
tal. Moreover, this capital does not become a form of 
fixed property: knowledge can be taught or transmit-
ted, the persons who have learned it can move from 
one organization to another, and obviously, when it 
is incorporated in equipment or inputs, it can be ac-
quired. This gives rise to different types of externali-
ties which transform both technological and 
educational capital into a form of social capital which 
we could term "knowledge capital". The accumula-
tion of this capital is greatly facilitated when there are 
suitable institutions -"innovation systems"- which 
support its development and generate dynamic inter-
actions between the educational system, technologi-
cal research centres and the enterprises themselves 
and which make it possible to take full advantage of 
the economies of scale of research and the externali-
ties - characteristic of technological know-how 
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(ECLAC, 1990 and 1996). These institutions are there-
fore a central element of "knowledge capital". 
Due to the very close relation between technical 
know-how and production experience, there are 
strong links of interdependence between the use and 
the generation of technology. Thus, the adaptation of 
technology can give rise to local innovations, and 
accumulated production experience can result in 
more extensive innovations. However, advances in 
terms of innovation are linked with deliberate efforts 
to generate new processes or new products or use 
new inputs, that is to say, with explicit investment 
efforts. The specific rents obtained by the innovative 
enterprise are in the nature of monopoly rents and 
represent the great incentive for such investment, 
which is further increased by laws providing for its 
legal protection. In competitive, technologically dy-
namic contexts, however, investment in technology 
becomes an essential requirement for the very sur-
vival of the companies operating in that market. 
Investments in this field involve fixed costs, as-
sociated with different types of indivisibilities, and 
the returns that can be expected from them are uncer-
tain. Even imitation involves fixed costs, because of 
the need to acquire information, the incomplete na-
ture of the latter, and the costs of patents and other 
forms of protection of intellectual property rights. For 
this reason, access to technology is more limited for 
small enterprises, and over time these tend to accu-
mulate dynamic competitive disadvantages associ-
ated with their lower level of learning by doing. In 
this context, at any given time the production sectors 
include enterprises with very different levels of tech-
nical knowledge, so that the neoclassical concept of 
the "representative firm" makes little sense. This in-
ternal differentiation of the sectors of production is of 
course essential for understanding the processes of 
reorganization resulting from competitive shocks, 
such as those due to the opening up of economies, or 
from contractionary setbacks. 
The foregoing considerations have far-reaching 
implications for public policies. They mean, first of 
all, that technological processes are marked by the 
predominance of dynamic economies of scale, within 
which comparative advantages are created as a result 
of production experience. They also mean that the 
loss of production experience can have cumulative 
effects over time which finally destroy or consider-
ably hold back technological know-how.9 Although 
competitive pressure has the virtue of doing away 
with complacent attitudes by firms and obliges them 
to keep up-to-date in their know-how,'0 it can also 
have the opposite effect: in particular, if it leads to a 
decline in the output of a company (or even a whole 
sector) it can give rise to cumulative effects on the 
company's competitiveness and prevent it from in-
vesting sufficiently in its technological adaptation. 
The predominance of defensive over offensive strate-
gies during the processes of production restructuring 
in Latin America and the Caribbean (see section II of 
this paper) clearly shows that the introduction of 
more competition does not always set in motion the 
forms of technological adaptation which have the 
greatest potential for the generation of comparative 
advantages ("systemic competitiveness", to use the 
term coined by Fernando Fajnzylber and extensively 
used by ECLAC over the last decade). All this explains 
why there is not a clear association between neutral-
ity of incentives and technological change." 
These factors justify State intervention in the 
creation, adaptation and dissemination of technology. 
This is also one of the few areas where State subsi-
dies are explicitly accepted by the World Trade Or-
ganization (within certain limits) and are therefore 
consistent with the present context of globalization. 
The protection of infant sectors of production or 
those which are in a stage of intensive learning,12 as 
well as the promotion of new export sectors with 
similar features, are the alternatives to this, but their 
efficient application requires clear time limits on such 
protection or promotion and a clear link between 
benefits and performance. 
It may be noted that in the protectionist stage of 
Latin American and Caribbean history these require-
ments were not fulfilled, so that the results in terms 
of increased productivity were clearly less than opti-
mal. This attitude was firmly rooted in some eco-
nomic policy patterns which are all too well known. 
For these reasons, while not completely discounting 
the possible use of protection instruments which com-
ply with the requirements we have posed, State ef-
9
 See, for example, the simple but elegant model by Krugman, 
1990, chapter 7. 
10
 This means that firms do maximize their profits, as they are 
below their production possibility curve, and competitive pres-
sure therefore forces them to be on it. 
" There is a considerable amount of literature on this matter. 
See, for example, the studies collected in Helleiner (1992). 
12
 On the basis of the arguments in question, there is also justi-
fication for the graduality of economic openness processes. 
However, this is now only of historical interest. 
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forts should be aimed rather at supporting the devel-
opment of innovation networks, promoting the estab-
lishment of new institutions, and allocating resources 
and generating incentives for channeling private re-
sources to these activities. Among such institutions 
are sectoral or regional technological research or pro-
ductivity centers, joint university-industry associa-
tions, technical assistance networks for small urban 
and rural enterprises, technology parks, venture capi-
tal funds for supporting technological activities, "en-
terprise brooders", incentives for innovation activities 
within firms or private contributions to technological 
institutions, etc. All these already form part of the 
Latin America and Caribbean scene, but their devel-
opment has not yet attained the level which is to be 
desired (Alcorta and Peres, 1998). 
2. Strategic complementarities 
There is no idea which is more central to classical 
theories of economic development -or to location 
theory, which serves as the basis for regional and 
urban development theories- than the concept of 
complementarity between investment decisions or the 
linkages (forward or backward) that they generate, to 
use Hirschman's classic concept (1958). When this 
coincides with the presence of economies of scale in 
production, this gives rise, in modern terminology, to 
"strategic complementarities" which lead to proc-
esses of agglomeration (Krugman, 1995).13 
Agglomeration phenomena lie at the very heart 
of the historical debates on economic development. 
Likewise, the observation that different economic 
structures give rise to different rates of growth 
through the strength or weakness of the economies of 
agglomeration they generate, as well as particular im-
balances associated with the nature of such structures 
and the way those imbalances are solved, lies at the 
heart of structuralist theories of development, ECLAC'S 
classic defence of industrialization was part of this 
tradition. In this context, the aggregate variables ana-
lysed by other growth theories may be seen as the 
effects rather than the causes of these structural dy-
namics. For example, rates of technical change may 
13
 Transport costs (and distance-related transaction costs in gen-
eral) play a rather more complex role. They can contribute to 
agglomeration but, if they are sufficiently high, they can give 
rise to the opposite phenomenon, as traditional location theory 
indicates. 
be completely different in different structural dynam-
ics, investment functions can also be affected, and a 
similar assertion may even be made regarding the 
rates of development of human capital they generate. 
This is not, of course, the place to analyse the 
costs and benefits of the classic industrialization 
strategy,14 but rather to examine the relevance of 
these strategic complementarities in the present stage 
of development of the region. Although the new tech-
nological revolution and globalization have eroded 
some of the bases for these processes of agglomera-
tion, their most important implication is that "sys-
temic competitiveness" (or its absence) is the result 
of synergies and externalities generated among the 
enterprises belonging to certain chains of production 
and the way these chains fit into the economy as a 
whole. This explains, for example, the importance of 
analysing the linkages generated by natural resource-
based production complexes (Ramos, 1998), or the 
way the integration processes currently under way are 
generating new production linkages between indus-
trial sectors of different countries (in the automobile 
industry, for example). Another significant implica-
tion in the present stage of development of the region 
is the desirability of developing new systems of ex-
port promotion which provide incentives for joint ac-
tion in the markets of destination by similar 
enterprises from the same region or country. This 
analysis also highlights the importance of promoting 
mechanisms which facilitate the exchange of infor-
mation among enterprises in a given sectoral chain of 
production (especially with regard to possible invest-
ment decisions), encourage strategic alliances be-
tween enterprises, give rise to complementary 
investments, further the execution of regular analyses 
of the competitiveness of specific sectors of produc-
tion in conjunction with the corresponding entrepre-
neurs, and encourage the development of research 
groups specializing in such analyses. The estab-
lishment of industrial parks is another strategy of the 
same type which is particularly important for modern 
regional and local planning. 
The need to take strategic complementarities into 
account in the new stage of development has been 
emphasized by ECLAC throughout the 1990s (for ex-
ample, in ECLAC, 1990, 1996 and 1998a). These pro-
My own contributions to this debate are incorporated in the 
introduction to the study by Cárdenas, Ocampo and Thorp (eds.), 
1998. 
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posais mean, in particular, that the new development 
strategy does not eliminate the need for new types of 
sectoral policies (or, as is sometimes expressed in a 
more restrictive manner, for "industrial policies"). The 
experience being accumulated in the region indicates 
that such policies must arise from joint efforts between 
the public and private sectors, which demands profound 
changes in the public and private institutions inher-
ited from the previous phase of development. The 
fundamental objective of such exercises should be to 
formulate joint "visions" and to reach a consensus on 
the way in which support mechanisms should be "tai-
lored" to particular sectors. At the global level, these 
mechanisms are of an essentially horizontal nature (in 
such fields as technological development, technical 
training, export promotion, infrastructure, credit, etc.), 
but in order to be effective they need to be specified 
in greater detail (for example, by indicating the na-
ture of the institutions which are to support the tech-
nological development of a specific sector, the 
collective requirements of the sector in terms of la-
bour skills, the way in which the financial resources 
needed for its expansion are to be ensured, etc.). 
It is obvious that, even though there might be 
theoretical justification for them, there are no 
grounds at present in the region for promoting more 
aggressive forms of sectoral planning like those car-
ried out by the Asian countries in the past. It is im-
portant to note, however, that although strategic 
sectoral decisions are often not explicit, this does not 
mean that they do not exist. Economic openness was 
a clear, more or less explicit, strategic decision: the 
decision to give stronger support to the sectors mak-
ing more intensive use of natural resources and elimi-
nate inefficient industrial branches. When public 
resources are scarce, decisions to allocate funds to 
some sectors for their technological activities or for 
the promotion of their exports also involve strategic 
decisions (to promote these sectors rather than others, 
or to promote them more than other sectors). For this 
reason, rather than concealing such decisions, it is 
desirable to make them explicit through "joint views" 
agreed upon by the public and private sectors, includ-
ing labour. 
3. Regulation of infrastructure services 
The growing privatization of public utilities and the 
opening of spaces for private participation in new 
infrastructure projects have generated important op-
portunities (for eliminating serious cases of ineffi-
ciency in the corresponding sectors and attracting 
fresh capital, while allocating scarce public resources 
to other sectors), but they have also presented innu-
merable challenges. Because of economies of scale 
and other types of technological difficulties (which 
have begun to be overcome in some cases), the infra-
structure sectors are almost invariably marked by im-
perfect competition and even in many cases by 
natural monopolies (especially at the regional and lo-
cal level, but even at the national level). Furthermore, 
in view of their character of non-tradeable services, 
in this case external competition does not play the 
same regulatory role as in the production of goods. 
The first challenge that arises in this context is 
the need to establish suitable regulatory frameworks 
to ensure that the prices charged in these cases are 
close to those that would be established in a competi-
tive situation and, in particular, that the greater effi-
ciency which may be derived from the privatization 
processes or from greater competition is effectively 
passed on to consumers. The regulatory problems in 
the transition to privatized infraestructure services are 
extremely complex, especially because they involve 
the task of creating markets and not just regulating 
existing ones. Furthermore, the agents are at different 
stages of assimilation of the new policy frameworks 
and are working with even more asymmetrical infor-
mation than in mature markets. It is worth emphasiz-
ing the decisive importance, in this context, of 
establishing not only highly qualified regulatory bod-
ies, but also superintendencies to monitor the applica-
tion of their decisions and enter one of the areas most 
often forgotten by the old policy framework: con-
sumer defence. 
The second challenge is the proper management 
of public guarantees. This problem is particularly im-
portant in new infrastructure projects, where the pri-
vate sector only participates if the State is willing to 
provide guarantees against risks that the private 
agents consider they cannot assume (regulatory risks 
and force majeure, but also risks regarding future in-
come, liquidity, or unforeseen cost increases). The as-
sumption of these risks by the State gives rise to 
considerable fiscal contingencies. For this reason, it is 
necessary, first of all, to design private participation 
schemes which minimize the granting of such guar-
antees, limiting the risks assumed by the State to 
those which cannot be insured in the market and 
which the private sector cannot really control. More-
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over, the risks assumed by the public sector must be 
suitably estimated. The corresponding calculations, 
even if imperfect, must be taken into account in the 
annual budget debate and it is even desirable that a 
value equivalent to the annual premium of the "insur-
ance" granted by the State should be explicitly budg-
eted. This would also make it possible to compare 
this form of financing with options which involve 
larger public sector resources, such as projects fi-
nanced by the public sector but privately managed.15 
The problems arising in connection with regula-
tion and tibie granting of guarantees bring us to a third 
challenge: the need to avoid rent-seeking practices 
V 
1. The challenge of equity 
The equity problems which characterize the region 
stem from highly unequal distributive structures, 
largely inherited from previous stages of develop-
ment. As noted in a recent report by ECLAC (1998d), 
they reflect a whole set of factors relating to educa-
tion, employment, wealth and demographic struc-
tures. The large inequality in the number of years of 
schooling of employed persons has been the factor 
given most emphasis in recent debates. The lack of 
equity is also related to the unequal distribution of 
wealth, which is even more concentrated than educa-
tional opportunities (see, in this respect, Biidsatl and 
Londoño, 1997). Likewise, the number of employed 
persons per household is smaller in low-income 
households, and the jobs they manage to obtain are 
less skilled. Finally, poor families have more depend-
ent children. 
In addition, behind the national patterns there are 
also considerable regional disparities, so that the 
problems of poverty are relatively more concentrated 
in those regions which have the greatest difficulty in 
integrating into the development process. Although 
in the long term migration tends to promote the level-
ling-out of regional disparities, it can have adverse 
15
 With respect to these questions, see the studies included in 
Irwin, Klein, Perry and Thobani (eds), 1997, and ECLAC, 
1998b, chapter LX. 
which can be just as much of an aberration as in the 
previous public scheme, if not more so. In this respect, 
it is essential to adopt social control mechanisms which 
avoid the "capture" of the regulatory bodies by the com-
panies they are supposed to regulate. It is also necessary 
to estimate and publicly discuss, in connection with the 
budget debate, the practices governing the granting of 
guarantees and the amounts of such guarantees given by 
State institutions, as well as establishing clear rules 
which eliminate "implicit" guarantees (i.e., the percep-
tion that private projects which fail will be rescued by 
the public sector), which can give rise to serious "moral 
hazard " issues. 
effects for long periods of time, since it is selective: 
that is to say, it tends to take the persons with the 
most human capital away from backward regions. 
The same thing occurs with the mobility of capital, 
which, although it may have levelling effects in the 
long term, can give rise for long periods, through 
economies of agglomeration, to a strong attraction of 
capital to the most dynamic centres of development. 
Following the studies by Morley (1994 and 
199S), various other studies have confirmed that pov-
erty tends to decline with economic growth. The in-
crease in poverty during the 1980s and its reduction 
during the 1990s is in line with this pattern. Strictly 
speaking, however, this is only true for urban pov-
erty, since rural poverty, and above all extreme rural 
poverty, behave in a much more inertial manner, typi-
cal of "hard core poverty" (Ocampo, 1998b). More-
over, the data fully confirm the deterioration in 
income distribution which has taken place over recent 
decades in a number of countries of the region.16 The 
analysis of this process has given rise to an active 
controversy involving fundamentally two alternative 
theories. The first of these posits the existence of 
an asymmetrical behaviour of the incomes of the 
poorest sectors in acute growth cycles like those 
which the Latin American economy has undergone in 
16
 For a fuller analysis of these trends, see Altimir (1997), Berry 
(1998), Morley (1994 and 1995), IDB (1997) and ECLAC (1997). 
Equity and social policy 
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recent decades: they tend to go down more in periods 
of crisis than they manage to recover in boom peri-
ods. This probably reflects the loss of human capital 
(experience) during crisis periods and asymmetrical 
behaviour of the labour market (employment cuts 
during the crisis are not followed by similar increases 
in the boom periods, those who lose their jobs also 
lose labour connections which they never recover, 
etc.). The second theory holds that economic liberali-
zation and globalization have tended to deteriorate 
income distribution. 
One of the authors who has supported the latter 
view most strongly is Albert Berry. This author has 
shown in various studies that there is evidence in the 
last quarter of a century that the introduction of eco-
nomic liberalization measures has been associated with 
often serious deterioration in income distribution 
(Berry, 1998).'7 The comparative study by Robbins 
(1996) also shows that trade openness processes have 
tended to give rise to greater inequality in labour in-
come distribution. The increases in the income dispari-
ties between more and less skilled workers during the 
1990s (ECLAC, 1997) and the sluggishness of job 
creation in the formal sector, already referred to in 
section II, may also help to confirm this view. This 
growing inequality in wages as a function of levels of 
skills does not seem to be confined to the region. 
Indeed, a recent report by UNCTAD (1997) indicates 
that this may be an almost universal pattern, since it 
has also affected a number of industrialized countries 
and some rapidly growing economies in the Asia-Pa-
cific region and in particular has given rise to severe 
pressures on the middle classes in many countries. 
There are various possible explanations for these 
trends. One of the most interesting is that of Rodrik 
(1997), who claims that globalization accentuates 
the asymmetry between the factors which can cross 
national frontiers most easily -capital and highly 
skilled labour- and those which cannot do so: less 
skilled labour. The possibility of relocating produc-
tion means that the demand for labour is more elastic 
in all countries, reducing the bargaining power of 
workers and increasing the instability of their income 
vis-à-vis demand disturbances. Furthermore, Berry 
(1998) claims that the explanation for this may be 
connected with the economies of scale in interna-
tional trade and finance, which are reflected in the 
17
 This author's information is taken from the cases of Argen-
tina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, the Dominican Republic and 
Uruguay, Costa Rica being an exception to this rule. 
bigger share of the biggest firms in each sector in 
these activities. These firms are, in turn, those which 
make intensive use of capital and/or more skilled la-
bour. It has also been suggested that the transfers of 
technology generated by trade, including technology 
incorporated in imported machinery and equipment, 
can cause developing countries in the midst of inter-
nationalization processes to adopt technologies which 
require highly skilled labour and were designed 
to meet the needs of the industrialized countries 
(Robbins, 1996). The production restructuring strate-
gies of Latin American enterprises in response to the 
greater openness and globalization have had unfa-
vourable effects on job creation, as already noted in 
previous sections. 
In the case of Latin America, there may be other 
explanations for this phenomenon. One of them is 
that the liberalization process took place after a decade 
of weakening social expenditure. Thus, the greater de-
mand for more skilled labour came up against an in-
elastic supply of such workers. Moreover, during the 
liberalization process no clear efforts were made to 
link up the demand for and supply of skills. Another 
explanation might be that the macroeconomic policy 
which has accompanied the reform process -espe-
cially the tendency towards revaluation of exchange 
rates and opening up of capital accounts- has given 
rise to growth patterns in which imports have grown 
more than exports, also generating a bias against the 
labour-intensive sectors. Macroeconomic manage-
ment has also been characterized by marked "stop 
and go" cycles associated to capital flows, which has 
hindered the generation of more stable jobs. 
2. Social policy ' 
These considerations mean that, coming as they did 
on top of an already unequal distributive structure, 
the debt crisis, liberalization and globalization (to 
which the different explanations attach different de-
grees of importance) have enormously increased the 
challenge with regard to equity. One of the great 
challenges facing the region is therefore to show mat 
the new development model is compatible with the 
gradual correction of the great existing social in-
equalities. If this objective is not attained, this could 
undermine the political bases of the reforms, which 
have been very sound so far, largely because the re-
covery of macroeconomic stability has been seen as a 
positive development by the population as a whole. 
Moreover -which is equally serious- social tensions 
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could arise which make governance difficult and 
erode the bases of the political consensuses which 
have made it possible to strengthen democracy in the 
region, undoubtedly another of the great achieve-
ments of recent years. In the longer term, the sequels 
of inequality and poverty could undermine the bases 
of systemic competitiveness on which the possibili-
ties of development within an increasingly open in-
ternational context depend. 
International experience shows some surprising 
results with regard to handling the social risks that 
globalization has brought with it. The study by Rodrik 
(1997) indicates that in the past, greater openness of 
economies has been compensated by greater social 
protection of the population by the State. This has 
been reflected in a positive relation between the de-
gree of openness and the size of the State. According 
to this author, this is true both for the OECD countries 
and for a broad sample of 115 countries, which 
would seem to indicate that the distributive tensions 
generated by processes of greater openness have been 
tackled in the past by trading economic liberalization 
for greater State protection through a more active so-
cial policy. 
Social expenditure is undoubtedly the most im-
portant component through which the State can influ-
ence income distribution. Indeed, there is ample 
proof that social expenditure has a significant effect 
on secondary income distribution. The information 
available for Latin America on this matter indicates 
that, in absolute terms, the higher-income groups 
benefit more from social expenditure. As a propor-
tion of the income of each stratum, however, the sub-
sidies channeled through such expenditure are greater 
for the poorer sections of the population. This global 
pattern is the result of the very different distributive 
impacts of different types of expenditure. The degree 
of focusing on the poor (that is to say, the proportion 
of the expenditure which is channelled to the poor in 
relation to the proportion of the population in a state 
of poverty) is high in the case of expenditure on 
health, primary education and, to a lesser extent, sec-
ondary education. In contrast, expenditure on social 
security and higher education has a generally regres-
sive tendency. Expenditure on housing is in an inter-
mediate situation, since it benefits in particular the 
middle strata of the income distribution scale. These 
results indicate that there is plenty of room for im-
proving income distribution through social expendi-
ture, but also for improving its targetting, as pointed 
out in a recent ECLAC study. The way in which such 
expenditure is financed is by no means irrelevant in 
this connection: financing from direct taxes tends to 
be more progressive than financing from indirect 
taxes and, what is equally important, unsuitable fi-
nancing which is reflected in an increase in inflation 
can cancel out the favourable distributive effects 
(ECLAC, 1998b, chapter VI). 
There is therefore a good deal of room for com-
bining economic liberalization with a more active so-
cial policy, as indeed traditional international patterns 
seem to reflect. It is necessary, then, to make an effort 
to reorient public expenditure towards the social sec-
tor -as Latin America has already begun to do in the 
1990s- and to target social expenditure and maximize 
its favourable distributive effects. Some countries 
could also possibly opt for additional expansion of 
social expenditure, financed from greater tax reve-
nues. Indeed, this was the alternative chosen by the 
Chilean government in the early years of the present 
decade, without thereby adversely affecting real in-
vestment or economic growth. This is also the option 
followed by Colombia in the 1990s (the country of 
the region which has most markedly increased its so-
cial expenditure in this decade), although in this case 
there has been a financial shortfall making necessary 
a fiscal adjustment which has not been carried out in 
full. In these cases, the net distributive impact will 
depend, as we have seen, on the nature of financing. 
In the long term, greater investment in human 
capital also makes it possible to influence one of the 
structural factors of income distribution. Thus, the 
existing studies show that greater allocation of re-
sources to education, which makes it possible to im-
prove the distribution of human capital in society, can 
have much greater effects on income distribution than 
those estimated in studies on the short-term incidence 
on distribution (see, for example, IDB, 1997). As a 
cautionary note, however, it should be emphasized 
that there is also confirmation that a big effort in 
education will tend to be reflected in decreasing re-
turns on the investment in it. Furthermore, as in a 
growth process the economy demands higher levels 
of education for the same type of job, there is a "de-
valuation" of education in the labour market and 
hence also of its capacity to generate higher income. 
This is indicated by a recent report by ECLAC 
(1998d). This report finds that the increase in the 
average years of schooling registered in recent dec-
ades in Latin America (by an average of three and a 
half years, if the number of years of schooling of 
young people between 20 and 24 are compared with 
BEYOND THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS: AN ECLAC PERSPECTIVE • JOSÉ ANTONIO OCAMPO 
C E P A L R E V I E W 6 6 « D E C E M B E R 1 9 9 6 25 
those of their parents) has not succeeded in improv-
ing the opportunities of young people from poor so-
cial strata. Thus, the report finds that only half of 
urban young people and a quarter of rural young peo-
ple have improved their educational level compared 
with their parents by more than the rise in the educa-
tional demands of the labour market, so that they 
effectively have greater employment opportunities 
than their parents. This fits in with the results of sur-
veys which indicate that only half of Latin American 
young people consider that they have better opportu-
nities than their parents. 
Likewise, the report in question shows that ef-
forts to expand the coverage of education have not 
been reflected in a reduction in the distance separat-
ing young people of different social strata. In particu-
lar, in comparison with the educational capital of 
their parents, the educational achievements of young 
Latin Americans have not improved (or have im-
proved only marginally) over the last 15 years.18 It 
was also noted that young people with the same edu-
cational level and the same occupation earn between 
30% and 40% more than the other young people in 
their age group if they come from households where 
the parents have higher incomes. This shows that the 
expansion of education in a context of social inequal-
ity does not always result in equality of opportunities. 
Even in Chile -where a better distribution of educa-
tional opportunities has coincided with a very dy-
namic economy and a positive rate of job creation, 
which has been reflected in a marked reduction in 
poverty- income distribution has nevertheless not 
shown any improvement so far. 
For this reason, although higher levels of educa-
tion and better distribution of educational opportuni-
ties are essential, they are not in themselves sufficient 
to improve income distribution. It is necessary to ap-
ply simultaneous policies in the areas of education, 
employment, distribution of wealth and population, 
and to direct particularly aggressive action on all 
these fronts towards rural areas and regions which are 
backward or have tended to lag behind with the 
changes in development patterns. 
In the case of education, the reforms should be 
aimed at ensuring that young people receive a full 
18
 At the beginning of the 1980s, for example, the proportion of 
young people whose parents had between six and nine years of 
schooling but who themselves succeeded in obtaining a full sec-
ondary education was between 33% and 43% in the countries 
studied; in the mid-1990s, this proportion was practically un-
changed, standing at between 36% and 46%. 
secondary education of suitable quality at a suitable 
age, and at reducing the enormous gap that still re-
mains in all countries between educational opportuni-
ties in the cities and in rural areas. They should also 
be aimed at making up for the disadvantages with 
which children from the poorest homes begin their 
studies, by expanding the coverage of pre-school 
education, keeping young people for a longer time in 
the school system, and dealing adequately with the 
problems of adolescent pregnancy, which affect the 
educational opportunities of both the mother and her 
children. As the extensive literature on this subject 
indicates, advances in education (and the special ef-
forts in this direction) must also be accompanied by 
conscious family planning to reduce the problem of a 
high ratio of dependents which characterizes the 
poorest households. 
With regard to employment, the most important 
efforts must be aimed at training for future employ-
ment and the development of integral support net-
works (management training, transfer of technology, 
credit, new marketing channels) for urban and rural 
small-scale and micro-enterprises, where the persons 
with the lowest incomes work. Although globaliza-
tion undoubtedly requires that some labour regula-
tions should be made more flexible, the solution of 
the structural employment problems in the region ob-
viously does not lie in the radical liberalization of 
the labour market. Furthermore, such greater labour 
flexibility as is politically agreed upon in each coun-
try must be accompanied by greater social protection 
in other fields. In particular, there is clear evidence in 
the region that more active policies with regard to 
minimum wages (obviously, within macroeconomi-
cally sustainable limits) have been associated with 
bigger reductions in the size of the poor sectors in the 
1990s (Morley, 1997). Systems for providing infor-
mation on employment opportunities and vocational 
training, especially for those who have lost their jobs, 
still lag far behind in the region. 
Finally, emphasis must be placed on the need to 
direct attention towards opportunities for improving 
the distribution of assets, such as policies designed 
to help small producers and social housing pro-
grammes. In this field, one of the aspects which 
deserves special attention is that of ways of redistrib-
uting assets which do not give rise to distortions in 
economic activity, such as the establishment or im-
provement of institutions for channeling credit to 
small enterprises or micro-enterprises without distort-
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ing the market, or the new agrarian reform schemes 
which make active use of the land market. 
3. Social policy and the second generation 
reforms 
The efforts to increase and target social expenditure 
in the region must be supplemented with a thorough 
reorganization of the sector to make the supply of 
social services more efficient and effective. This is 
one of the central aspects of what have been called 
the "second generation" reforms, whose essential 
purpose is to increase the efficiency of the markets 
and incorporate criteria based on a microeconomic 
rationale in the provision of those services where this 
approach has previously been absent. 
With regard to social services, emphasis has been 
placed on the introduction of elements of competition in 
their supply (creation of quasi-markets), with the par-
ticipation of private agents and changes in the forms of 
State support from the traditional subsidies for the sup-
ply of such services to demand subsidies. At the same 
time, and in a complementary manner, efforts have been 
made to decentralize the provision of those services for 
which the State continues to responsible, to create new 
systems of results-oriented public management, to give 
the public bodies responsible for supplying services ef-
fective autonomy, and to establish participatory mecha-
nisms for the control of public management. All the 
components in this reorganization, but especially the 
first-named, are designed to tackle the government fail-
ures which have become evident in the past in the pro-
vision of social services and which are reflected in the 
inefficiency and low quality of the services provided by 
the State. 
Experience shows that while the private sector 
responds dynamically to the incentives given to it, 
such participation is subject to market failures, both 
of a traditional nature, related with economies of 
scale, and failures associated with information prob-
lems, highlighted in the more recent literature, which 
give rise to phenomena of imperfect competition, ad-
verse selection and "moral hazard" (Ocampo, 1996). In 
economies with severe disparities in distribution, the 
most important problem is that of the natural attrac-
tion, generated by the market, whereby the private 
sector directs its supply -both in terms of quantity 
and, in particular, quality- to the higher income groups. 
This problem is not necessarily solved through a system 
of demand subsidies, and therefore requires that the 
State should design instruments to increase the sup-
ply directed to the lower income groups. As the pub-
lic supply has in many cases likewise been incapable 
of reaching certain sectors of the population (as for 
example in social housing programmes), it is neces-
sary to promote the participation of new agents, gen-
erally of a non-profit or community nature. 
The above difficulties are further accentuated when 
the design of private participation schemes does not in-
clude clear principles of solidarity, as the private health 
system in Chile shows (ECLAC, 1998b, chapter VII). In 
this case, adverse selection -both by income levels 
and by the health risks associated with the age of the 
population covered- can be very marked. The introduc-
tion of solidarity elements does not automatically 
solve this problem, however. Thus, for example, the 
health reform in Colombia established a system in 
which the benefits are totally independent of the 
amount of the contribution, but the response of the 
private sector to the needs of the poorest strata has 
nevertheless been frustrating. The private response 
can also be geographically unbalanced: the response 
is better in large cities, but it is insufficient in small 
towns and the rural sector, where -because of the 
very low economies of scale- there may be "natural 
monopolies" in many services in conditions in which, 
moreover, their provision is not profitable. 
When supply does not respond properly -in terms of 
quantity or quality- to the incentives generated by de-
mand subsidies, it may be desirable to design intermedi-
ate formulas which might be called "demand-oriented 
supply subsidies" and which would make it possible to 
influence supply, including the quality of the services 
provided, while at the same time obtaining the tradi-
tional benefits of demand subsidies in terms of the 
targeting of beneficiaries. Such intermediate schemes 
consist of the signing of contracts with particular 
agents to provide services to a specific population 
group through a system of competitions, or the pro-
motion of community or non-profit organizations 
with the explicit purpose of entrusting them with the 
administration of the services in question. This could 
also be a suitable system for promoting the creation 
of new services or improving the quality of existing 
ones (for example, raising the quality of the educa-
tional system, as is being done in Chile). 
Problems of information are much more seri-
ous in the services markets than in those for goods. 
In particular, there are virtually insoluble asymme-
tries in information between those who provide 
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highly specialized services and those who receive 
them (between doctors and patients, in particular, in the 
case of health, but similar phenomena are also observed 
in education). For this reason, the development of quasi-
markets for the provision of social services requires the 
establishment of certain minimum schemes for the pro-
vision of information, as well as highly developed in-
struments for protecting users. 
The reforms adopted in this context must be 
pragmatic and must therefore involve a substantial 
component of gradualism and learning from experi-
ence. It must also be borne in mind that the new 
schemes of private participation are not a substitute 
for the public supply of services in all sectors. For 
this reason, efforts to improve public supply through 
decentralization, the autonomy of the units providing 
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undoubtedly vital elements of any reform with regard 
to social services. 
Finally, it should be emphasized that one of the 
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mation and quality control of the services provided. 
This is particularly important when the specialized 
nature of the services does not guarantee the transpar-
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their suppliers. This is a matter which is still at an 
incipient stage and which will require considerable 
efforts in the years to come. 
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